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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

vs.

:

GORDON LEON WALLS

:

Case No. 20030139

Defendant/Appellant.
:
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
The State, in its Brief of Appellee, raises several issues, which were not fully
addressed by the Appellant in the Appellant's brief. The first issue is that this
Court should overturn a line of cases that allows the review of Rule 11 violations
under the plain error doctrine. The second issue argues that the Defendant's
actions constituted invited error, and therefore should be disallowed. The final
claim is that the Defendant's constitutional claim that he was incompetent fails on
the grounds that Appellant did not properly marshal the evidence. The Appellant
will address each of these issues in the order listed above.

POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT OVERRULE THE LINE OF
CASES ALLOWING APPELLATE REVIEW OF A RULE 11
VIOLATION UNDER THE PLAIN ERROR DOCTRINE

The State has argued in its brief that this Court should overrule a long line of
cases that have applied the plain error doctrine in a Rule 11 violation. (See; State v.
Dean 57 P.2d 1106, (Utah Ct. App. 2002), State v. Hittle 47 P.3d 101 (Utah 2003),
State v. Tarnawiecki 5 P.3d 1222 (Utah 2002), State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772,
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), State v. Ostler, 996 P.2d 1065, (Utah Ct. App. 2000), and
State v. Valencia, 116 P.2d 1332, (Utah Ct. App. 1989)) The State has made this
argument cognizant of the doctrine of stare decisis, and the substantial burden that
is required in overturning prior precedent. Defendant agrees that the doctrine of
stare decisis is applicable and that the burden required for overturning prior
precedent is substantial. The Defendant disagrees with the State that this is an
appropriate case in which to do so.
The Utah Appellate Courts have long recognized the plain error doctrine,
and have applied it in numerous cases and settings. A small sampling of these
cases include: State in re T.M. v. State, 73 P.3d959, (Utah Ct. App. 2003)
(recognizing plain error on parental termination cases); State v. Dominguez, 72
P.3d 127, (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (plain error claim available in both hearsay
testimony and the State eliciting testimony beyond the scope of a pretrial ruling);

State v. Smith, 65 P.3d 648, (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (plain error argument allowed in
a failure to properly instruct a jury issue); State v. Bloomfield, 63 P.3d 110 (Utah
Ct. App. 2003) (court allowed plain error analysis of a lack of foundation issue);
State v. Shumway, 63 P.3d 94 (Utah 2002) (plain error doctrine applied to a failure
to object to jury instruction); State v. Samora, 59 P.3d 604 (Utah Ct. App. 2002)
(plain error review in an improper sentence case which resulted in a reversal. This
case applied a plain error analysis despite the failure to brief such by appellant
counsel); State v. Bradley, 57 P.3d 1139 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (plain error review
of prosecutorial misconduct); State v. Diaz, 55 P.3d 1131 (Utah Ct. App. 2002)
(plain error analysis allowed in an insufficient evidence case); State v. Calliham,
55 P.3d 573 (Utah 2002) (plain error review of confrontation clause violation); and
State v. Bluff 52 P.3d 1210 (Utah 2002) (plain error review applied to an
ineffective assistance of counsel case)
The State is requesting that this Court carve out a limited exception to the
plain error doctrine seeking that it not be applied in Rule 11 cases. In doing so the
State is asking that this Court ignore the very reason for the plain error doctrine.
Utah Appellate Courts have long recognized the necessity of plain error doctrine to
prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice due to the occasional inadequacies in trial
counsel. In State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989) the Court stated:

3

The plain error rule permits the appellate court to assure that justice is
done, even if counsel fails to act to bring a harmfully erroneous ruling
to the attention of the trial court.
The very concept of justice presumes that all individuals be treated equally.
This is particularly necessary when those individuals are criminal defendants. The
constant striving of courts to meet this concept of justice and equal protection
under the law is a basic tenet to the very Constitution of this country. The 14th
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. {Emphasis added)
Likewise, the Constitution of the State of Utah, and Article I Section 2
provides; "All political power is inherent in the people; and all free governments
are founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit".
While Appellant recognizes that this goal of justice and equal protection
may not be universally attainable, this Court should do everything in its power in
advancement of this noble objective.
The Merriam Webster's Dictionary definition of justice includes: "the quality
of the being just, impartial, or fair"; and "the principal or ideal of just dealing or
right action". This definition is at the heart of the plain error doctrine. This Court
has long recognized that occasionally criminal defendants are not adequately

represented. This Court has established the plain error doctrine to rectify those
inequitable situations.
Finally, the State proposes that the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §7713-6 somehow precludes appellate court review of a Rule 11 issue. The language
of Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 is not specialized in its directive that the trial court
makes the original review. In many cases where the appellate courts have applied
the plain error doctrine, there is a statute that specifically directed the trial court to
make the original decision. (See Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 104(a); Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure Rule 17(6); Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 19(e);
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 22(e); Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 24(a)). Furthermore, a review on appeal, as in the present case, promotes
finality in that the defendant would thereafter be precluded from raising that issue
under a Rule 65B1 motion.
The State has cited the case of State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703 (Utah App.
1994) to support their position that the trial court should have the final say
regarding the withdrawal the plea. (Appellee Br. 29)

The court in State v.

Brocksmith however noted the Appellant Courts duty to review, and reverse if
necessary, an abuse of discretion by the trial court in a Rule 11 case in stating:
A trial court's failure to comply strictly with Rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure in accepting a guilty plea is good cause,
1

Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

as a matter of law, for the withdrawal of that plea. State v. Smith, 812
P.2d 470, 476 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah
1992); see also State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah App. 1994)
(holding that trial court has abused discretion as matter of law if it
does not permit withdrawal of plea not made in strict compliance with
Rule 11). {State v. Brocksmith Footnote 1 at 707)

The Appellee claims that this Court should overturn a number of cases that
have sought to ensure justice. The Appellee offers little by way of reason for this
departure from justice. The Defendant would submit that the interest of justice
requires the upholding of this line of case law. By doing so, this Court can bolster
public confidence in the court system with little detrimental effect. The result of
granting the Appellant's request on appeal does not unjustly free him from all legal
obligations. Rather the result is that the matter be sent back to the trial court for a
proper and just disposition. That disposition will be either a trial on the merits, or
the entry of a plea negotiation wherein the Defendant is fully informed of all of his
rights.

That disposition will not result in charges being dropped against the

Defendant, nor does the Defendant seek that remedy.
Finally, the State asks this Court to reverse the plain error doctrine in Rule
11 cases because it lacks analytical support. The fact that this Court has not made
an extensive analytical analysis of the plain error rule as applied to a Rule 11
violation does not mean that this Court has blindly applied the plain error rule in
this circumstance. The doctrine of stare decisis allows this Court to simply cite a

case, with the understanding that the previous analysis contained in those cited
cases would apply to the case at bar. To propose that the Appellate Courts be
required to do otherwise would result in appellate decisions hundreds of pages
long.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S RULE 11 CLAIMS ARE NOT INVITED
ERROR.
The State's next point is that the Defendant's Rule 11 claims should be
rejected as invited error. Although the Appellate Courts have periodically ruled
that if the defendant led the court into the error, they are precluded from claiming
plain error under the invited error rule. (See State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343
(Utah 1997)) This Court has ruled that Rule 11 must be strictly adhered to, and any
failure constitutes a violation. In State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, ^f 23 the Court
reiterated its long-standing requirement of strict compliance in Rule 11 cases.
This Court in the case of State v. Corwell 1A P.3d 1171 (Utah App. 2003)
was presented with a case with almost identical facts to the case at bar. In Corwell,
the court ruled:
The State contends that by failing to include the right to a speedy trial
and the provision concerning the limited right to appeal in the plea
statement, and by failing to point out the omissions when the trial
judge asked "if there was anything either one of you would have me
ask your client regarding Rule 11 appointments," Corwell invited
error. We disagree. "[I]t is not sufficient to assume that defense
attorneys make sure that their clients fully understand the contents of
n

the affidavit." [State v Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,1313 (Utah 1987)].
The duty to ensure that defendants know and understand the rights
they are surrendering when pleading guilty rests not on the parties, but
on the trial court. (State v. Corwell at 1175)
In the present case the State contends that by stating to the trial court, that
the plea hearing colloquy complied with Rule 11, the defendant invited the trial
court error.

The holding in State v. Corwell infra would indicate otherwise.

Furthermore the argument of the defendant in his motion to withdraw plea was that
the plea was not voluntarily entered. Although the majority of that hearing focused
on the defendant's mental capacity to enter the plea, the issue of voluntariness
clearly was raised at the trial court level. The fact that defense counsel did not
raise the issue of the illusory promise of the plea negotiations is exactly the type of
issue this court should here on appeal. If defense counsel was ignorant of the
illusory nature of the prosecutors promise to write to the Board of Pardons, then
the plain error standard would apply. If defense counsel knew that the prosecutors
promise was of no effect, and thereafter allowed his client to enter a plea without
informing him of this critical fact, then plain error needs to apply.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANT DID PROPERLY MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE WITH REGARDS TO THE DEFENDANT'S
MENTAL STATUS AT THE TIME OF THE ENTRY OF PLEA.

The State contends that the Defendant did not properly marshal the evidence
and therefore this Court should summarily reject Defendant's claims. (Appellee
Br. 38) The State contends that the Defendant made only two references to the
alienist's findings in their brief. (Appellee Br. 39) The State fails to describe to the
Court the extensive marshaling of evidence in the statement of facts. At the risk of
becoming duplicative the Defendant submits the following as evidence of its
attempt marshal evidence. This is found at pages 12 and 13 of Appellant Brief.
Mr. Potter interviewed the defendant and found "Bottom line
on it was that seemed to me he was tracking appropriately, that he
understood what the charges were, he understood the possible
penalties. " (R. 183/17) He testified that the defendant told him that he
heard voices, which had told him to enter the guilty plea, but Mr.
Potter stated, "With the information that he gave me about the way
the voices were ostensibly acting at that point in time did not seem
consistent with the way that auditoiy hallucinations work with a
person who has schizophrenia. " (R. 183/20) Mr. Potter stated that at
the time of the interview that he "felt him to be competent" but that he
didn 't make a specific finding of competence for the period of March
26, 2002. (R. 183/25)

Dr Rick Hawks also evaluated the defendant for mental

competency.

He testified that it was possible that the defendant was faking mental
illness. (R. 183/32) He also found originally that the defendant may
have so mental illness, including schizophrenia, but could not make
such a finding,

or rule such a diagnosis

out. (R.

183/32,33)

Furthermore, he did not do an analysis of the defendant's mental state
as of the date of the plea, and therefore the court continued the
hearing, appointed

another psychologist,

determine the defendant's

and instructed

both to

mental competency as of the date of the

plea. (R. 183/63-67)
After additional

examinations

Dr. Hawks produced

an

amended

report, and testified on Jan28, 2003 that at the time of the plea the
defendant "appeared to comprehend and appreciate the charges and
allegations against him." (R. 184/10) He demonstrated the ability to
disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind, " (R.
184/10) and was able to "adequately [comprehend] and [appreciate]
the range and nature

of possible

penalties."

(R. 184/10)

He

understood the adversary nature of the proceedings against him " and
manifested appropriate courtroom behavior on March 26 [2002] " (R.
184/10,11) Dr. Hawks testified that the defendant did have a mental

illness in the "schizophrenic spectrum",

"a psychotic thought

disorder, perhaps. " (R. 184/15)
Dr. Beverly 0 'Connor, a neuropsychologist was then called to testify.
She testified that although it was possible the defendant was faking a
mental illness, she thought he was trying to cooperate, and not faking
a mental illness. (R.184 /27,33)
The Defendant then made his arguments and condensed this lengthy
recitation of facts into two very clear conclusory statements. The defendant has
adequately marshaled the evidence, and therefore this Court should address the
issue raised.
DATED this f2. da Y o f November, 2003.
RANDALL W. RICHARDS
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant
to Karen A. Klucznik, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160
East 300 South, 6th Floor PO Box 140854 SLC, Utah 84114-0180, postage
prepaid this
day of November, 2003.

RANDALL W. RICHARDS
Attorney at Law

11

